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NoTEs
CONCLUSIONS

The practical question presented by these cases is that to prevent
unnecessary litigation the thoughtful attorney must concern himself with
the appropriate method for expression of the shareholders' agreement which
he is drafting. If a court followed the line of reasoning as in the Montana
decision, then an agreement "without the realm of corporate structure"
would seem to be called for, but when the contract is not one which is
likely to be held as opposed to "public policy," then a by-law provision
might be appropriate to bind the greatest amount of shareholders. In any
event, it is a question which must be given due consideration before the
agreement is submitted to the shareholders.
The proposed Wyoming Business Corporation Act eliminates this
problem when the agreement concerns the transferability and sale of
shares. Section 32 reads as follows:
The articles of incorporation or the by-laws of a corporation,
or an agreement among all the shareholders of a corporation may
impose restrictions on the sale or other disposition of its shares,
and on the transfer thereof, which do not unreasonably restrain
or prohibit transferability if each such restriction is copied at
length or in summary form on the face, or so copied on the back
and referred to on the face, of each certificate representing shares
to the transfer of which restriction applies.
The importance of this provision is readily appreciated by making a brief
survey of the cases involving the enforceability of an invalid by-law as a
contract. Most of the cases cited involving this proposition involve by-laws
restricting or regulating the right of shareholders to sell or transfer
their stock. 1
FLOYD R.

KING

THE END OF THE TRUSTEE IN BANKRUPTCY AS THE IDEAL
GENERAL CREDITOR: LEWIS v. MANUFACTURERS
NATIONAL BANK OF DETROIT
The second sentence of Section 70, sub. c of the Bankruptcy Act,
popularly called the "strong-arm clause," reads as follows:
The trustee, as to all property, whether or not coming into
ossession or control of the court, upon which a creditor of the
ankrupt could have obtained a lien by legal or equitable proceedings at the (late of bankruptcy, shall be deemed vested as of
such date with all the rights, remedies, and powers of a creditor
then holding a lien thereon by such proceedings, whether or not
such a creditor actually exists.'
The rights therein conferred upon the trustee are not derivative from
the rights of actual creditors; these rights are hypothetical.'-' The trustee's
11.
1.
2.

Annot ...... Invalid Bylaw as Contract, 159 A.L.R. 291.
11 U.S.C. § 110(c) (1952 ed.)
Ibid. ". . . whether or not such a creditor actually exists."
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rights under the strong-arm clause may be superior to those of actual lien
creditors in that he ispresumed to be without noticeA to have complied with
all requirements for the perfection of his lien, 4 and to have a lien for an
unlimited amount.5 His rights may be superior to the rights of the bankrupt himself in that they relate to "all property, whether or not coming
into possession of the court, upon which a creditor of the bankrupt could
have obtained a lien ....6 Except for the limitation that the trustee's lien
commences only "at the date of bankruptcy," 7 the trustee under the strongarm clause is truly the "ideal" lien creditor."
The troublesome problem is that "[a]lthough Section 70(c) is clear
enough in fixing the time as to which the trustee's lien is deemed to attach,
it leaves to unguided inference when the trustee is deemed to have extended
the credit whereby he became the hypothetical creditor of the strong-arm
clause."'' This problem came to a head in Constance v. Harvey,'0 wherein
the rule was laid down that the trustee, as the ideal lien creditor, was also a
general creditor at any time most advantageous to the trustee prior to the
date of bankruptcy." if, therefore, the applicable state law should permit
any possible general creditor to avoid the particular security interest by
E.g., Hoffman v. Cream-O-Products, 180 F.2d 649 (2d Cir. 1950), cert. denied,
340 U.S. 815.
4. E.g., Sampsell v. Straub, 194 F.2d 228 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 927.
5. The "ideal" amount of any lien would be infinity, or at least an amount sufficient
to invalidate all unperfected liens that can be avoided by the trustee in bankruptcy.
This implication in the word "ideal" should be sufficient authority to sustain
this proposition. Some decisions, e.g., Miller v. Sulmyer, 263 F.2d 513 (9th Cir.
1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 838, have relied upon Moore v. Bay, 284 U.S. 4, 52 S.Ct.
3, 76 L.Ed. 133, 76 A.L.R. 1198 as authority here. This appears unwarranted in
view of the fact that the holding of that case was based upon the existence of
actual creditors, a requirement not necessary under the express provisions of the
strong-arm clause. Supra note 2.
6. Supra note I.
7. Ibid. Section 1(13) of the Bankruptcy Act, II U.S.C. § 1 (13), defines the "date
of bankruptcy" as the date when the petition is filed.
8. The classic statement on the rights of the trustee under the strong-arm clause was
made by Judge Holmes, that the trustee under this clause "stands here as the ideal
creditor, irreproachable and without notice, armed cap-a-pie with every right and
power which is conferred by the law of the state upon its most favored creditor who
has acquired a lien by legal or equitable proceedings." In re Waynesboro Motor
Co., 60 F.2d 668, 669 (S.D. Miss. 1932).
The trustee may not be the "ideal" lien creditor under all circumstances. There
are cases holding that where § 70(c) of the Bankruptcy Act comes into conflict
with § 3672 of the Internal Revenue Code, § 3672 controls and that the trustee
is,for certain tax purposes, not to be considered as a judgment creditor. The
whole question is thoroughly explored in the majority and dissenting opinions
in In re Fidelity Tube Corp., 278 F.2d 776 (3d Cir. 1960) ; the case is discussed in
Note, 35 Ind. L.J. 351 (1960).
9. 4 Moore, Collier on Bankruptcy, 14th ed., 70.51, p. 1429, hereafter cited as Collier.
10. 215 F.2d 571 (2d Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 913.
11. The case involved a chattel mortgage held not to have been filed within a reasonable time. The New York Court of Appeals had previously held in Karst v. Gane,
136 N.Y. 316, 32 N.E. 1073 (1893) that, should a chattel mortgage not be filed
within a reasonable time, the New York Lien Law, § 230 permitted any creditor
who had extended credit during the interval between the execution and filing of
the mortgage to avoid this mortgage by subsequently, even after the mortgage had
been recorded, obtaining a lien on his unsecured claim. In the Constance case,
supra note 10. there were no actual intervening general creditors. Even so, the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit permitted the trustee to prevail over
the belatedly perfected chattel mortgage by ruling that the trustee, as the 'ideal"
lien creditor under the strong-arm clause, was also, in effect, a prior ideal general
creditor who could assume the rights of this non-existent intervening general
creditor and therefore avoid the mortgage in bankruptcy.
3.

NOTES

subsequently obtaining a lien on his unsecured claim, the trustee could
avoid security interest in bankruptcy. 12 The geographical limitation
on the application of Constance is apparent; only where the law of the
particular state protects some possible class of general creditors against
subsequently perfected security interests could the Constance rule have
The rule, subject to this geographical limitation, would
any effect.
have application against any type of security interest.1 4 It had purportedly
been extended to deny an increase in homestead exemption to the bankrupt
where the increase had previously been held by the state court to be void
1
as to creditors who were such prior to the effective date of the increase. 12.

13.

14.

15.

Theoretically the trustee could assume the rights of several different hypothetical
general creditors of the same bankrupt. For instance, where the bankrupt was
involved in several secured transactions belatedly perfected and the intervals between execution and recording did not coincide in time so that one hypothetical
general creditor could avoid them all, the trustee could still avoid them all by
assuming the rights of several hypothetical general creditors, each one having
extended credit at a different time.
The trustee as hypothetical general creditor is even more "ideal" than the trustee
as lien creditor. He must be presumed to have extended credit without notice
and his unsecured claim must be presumed to be of an infinite amount; in addition.
the point in time when the credit is deemed to have been extended is not, of
course, limited to the date of bankruptcy, but at any date most advantageous to
the trustee.
The possible relationships under the various state recording laws between secured
70.51, p. 1430. The chattel mortand unsecured creditors are set out in Collier,
gage laws and conditional sales laws of the several states can be found in Jones,
Chattel Mortgages and Conditional Sales (Bowers ed. 1933).
E.g., chattel mortgages, Conti v. Volper, 229 F.2d 317 (2d Cir. 1956); conditional
sales In re American Texticle Printers Co., 152 F.Supp. 901 (D.N.J. 1957); accounts
receivable, Blackford v. Commercial Credit Corp., 263 F.2d 97 (5th Cir. 1959);
equitable mortgages capable of filing, In re Plymouth Glass Co., 171 F.Supp. 650
(E.D. Mich. 1957) ; trust receipts, see Marsh, Constance v. Harvey-The "Strong-Arm
Clause" Re-Evaluated, 43 Cal. L. Rev. 65 (1955); real estate transactions, see In re
Plymouth Glass Co., supra.
Serious questions of policy arise when the Bankruptcy Act becomes an instrument
used to limit or deny exemptions granted under state law, in spite of the strong
policy reasons behind these exemptions. Section 6 of the Bankruptcy Act, II
U.S.C. § 24, states that "[t]this Act shall not affect the allowance to bankrupts of
the exemptions which are prescribed by the ... State laws in force at the time of the
" The Federal courts have, however, superimposed the
filing of the petition ....
strong-arm clause upon section 6 as a limitation thereto. The potentialities of this
limiting force was first demonstrated in Sampsell v. Straub, 194 F.2d 228 (9th Cir.
1952), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 927. In this case the bankrupt did not record his
homestead exemption as required by state law and therefore was not effective at
the date of bankruptcy. The court held that the trustee's lien under the strong-arm
clause was of the type that under the state law would prevail over the unperfected
homestead and that the trustee could therefore avoid the exemption in bankruptcy.
In the subsequent cases of England v. Sanderson, 236 F.2d 641 (9th Cir. 1956) and
Towers v. Curry, 247 F2d 738 (9th Cir. 1957) the same court held that where, under
state law, the homestead exemption applied only to subsequent creditors, and where
there were creditors prior to the effective date of an increase in the amount of the
exemption, the trustees, under the Constance rule of the strong-arm clause, could
step into the shoes of these actual prior creditors and avoid the increase in bankruptcy. The court became confused as to the rationale of Constance (the court
apparently corrected itself in the subsequent case of Miller v. Sulmeyer, 263 F.2d
513 (9th Cir. 1959) cert. denied, 361 U.S. 838), but the lethal effect upon state
exemptions of the "ideal" general creditor theory in made evident. As a general
creditor at the ideal time, the trustee can assume the rights of a general creditor
prior to any increase in exemption (or in an extreme case even prior to the original
exemption, statutes of limitation and other factors permitting) and thereby avoid
the increase (or possibly the entire exemption) in bankruptcy. The whole idea of
the Bankruptcy Act being used to deny state exemptions to the bankrupt has been
the subject of severest criticisms. Exhaustive discussions of this whole problem
can be found in Comment, 68 Yale L.J. 1459 (1959) and Kennedy, Limitation of
Exemptions in Bankruptcy, 45 Iowa L. Rev. 445 (1960). Constitutional problems
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It had been held to be unavailable for use "as a basis for determining
relative priorities between two lien holders as against whom the trustee
claims no right."'t
Constance has been criticized both judicially' 7 and extra-judicially; 18
it was both followed' and rejected 20 by the lower Federal courts; it had

16.
17.

18.

19.

of retroactive exemption changes are discussed in Comment, I Stanford L. Rev.
350 (1949).
Brookhaven Bank and Trust Co. v. Gwin, 253 F.2d 17, 23 (5th Cir. 1958).
In re Gondola Associates, 132 F.Supp. 205 (E.D.N.Y. 1955); In re Di Pierro, 159
F.Supp. 497 (D. Me. 1958); 1n re Billings, 170 F.Supp. 253 (W.D. Mo. 1959);
Blackford v. Commercial Credit Corp., 263 F.2d 97 (5th Cir. 1959); Bissell v. Doty
Discount Corp., 183 F.Supp. 783 (W.D. Mich. 1960); In re Alikasvich, 275 F.2d 454
(6th Cir. 1960). cert. granted, 363 U.S. 837; Lewis v. Manufacturers National Bank
of Detroit. 81 S.Ct. 347 (1961).
Seligson. Bankruptcy, 30 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 558 (1955) ; Comment, 30 N.Y.U. L. Rev.
1113 (1955); Marsh, Constance v. Harvey-The "Strong-Arm Clause" Re-Evaluated,
43 Cal. L. Rev. 65 (1955); Seligson, Creditors' Rights, 32 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 708 (1957);
Weintraub, Levin and Bedlock, The Strong-Arm Claues Strikes the Belated Chattel
70.51, pp. 1432-1433; Comment,
Mortgage, 25 Ford. L. Rev. 261 (1956); Collier,
57 Mich. L. Rev. 1227 (1959); Maclachlan, Two Wrongs Make a Right, 37 Tex.
But see, Klenberg and Masterson, Constance v. Harvey-A
L. Rev. 676 (1959).
Defense, 62 Conim'l L.J. 124 (1957); Note, 45 Va. L. Rev. 573 (1959).
It is difficult to determine the extent to which the Federal courts have been
willing to follow Constance, though certainly judicial approval of the case has
not been overwhelming. A number of cases have either purported to follow
Constance or at least to express approval of it, but it can be stated that outside
the Second Circuit there is no case where a correct interpretation of the Constance
rule has been used as the sole basis for invalidating a belatedly perfected security
interest in bankruptcy. There are several reasons why this case, which has caused
so much controversy has had such little practical effect. Some of these reasons are as
follows: (1) As discussed above, supra note 13 and text relating thereto, Constance
can be applied only in those jurisdictions wherein the state law protects some
class of general creditors against belatedly perfected security interests. This geographical limitation- permits the courts to "distinguish" Constance on the facts
(state law here becomes a question of fact so far as the strong-arm clause is concerned) without ever accepting or rejecting the rule, where the applicable state
law affords no protection to general creditors against perfected security interests.
Examples of this approach to the problem are In re American Textile Printers Co.,
152 F.Supp. 901 (D.N.J. 1957), and In re Freedman, 168 F.Supp. 25 (E.D.Mich.
1958) , affirmed. Hertzberg v. Associates Discount Corp., 272 F.2d 6 (6th Cir. 1959)
where "the court assumes but does not decide, that the decision in Constance v.
Harvey constitutes good law ...." (2) Under the Constance rule, dual rights are
conferrcd upon the trustee, those of lien creditor at the date of bankruptcy, and
those of general creditor prior to bankruptcy. The case has been cited for each
of these propositions; where it has been cited only as authority for the trustee's
rights as lien creditor it is at least questionable whether the court adopts the rule
insofar as it confers upon the trustee the rights of a prior general creditor. In any
event, in this context, the Constance rule has no practical effect. E.g., In re
Plymouth Glass Co., 171 F.Supp. 650 (E.D. Mich. 1957), wherein the court cites
Constance for the proposition that the trustee as lien creditor can invalidate an
unperfected mortgage in bankruptcy under the strong-arm clause. (3). Through
sheer misinterpretation, some courts have purported to follow Constance without
actually having done so. This result may result at least in part from the lack
of clarity in the Constance opinion, the court's reasoning there being that since an
existing general creditor could have avoided the mortgage, and since the trustee
was the 'ideal" lien creditor, the trustee could therefore avoid the mortage in
bankruptcy. How the trustee reaches the position of prior general creditor from
position of lien creditor is not spelled out, and has been the result of misin
terpretation. E.g., England v. Sanderson, 236 F.2d 641 (9th Cir. 1956) and Towers
v. Curry, 247 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1957) wherein the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
rely upon the existence of actual creditors to permit the trustee to avoid an increase
in state homestead exemption in bankruptcy under the strong-arm clause, although
the trustee's rights thereunder are clearly hypothetical and not dependent upon
the existence of actual intervening. This same confusion as to the proper rationale
existed even before Constance, e.g., in Zamore v. Goldblatt, 194 F.2d 933 (2d Cir.
1952) the court relied upon the existence of an actual intervening general creditor
to invalidate a belatedly perfected chattel mortgage under the strong-arm clause.

NOTES

even been judicially anticipated.2 1 The various criticisms of Constance
were: that it was a misconstruction of the plain language of the strong-arm
clause, which limits the trustee's rights thereunder as of the date of
bankruptcy; 22 that it misinterpreted the history and purpose of the
2
strong-arm clause; 23 that it rendered 70e (l) a nullity;

4

that it interfered

with the legitimate authority of the several states to set the conditions
upon which secured transactions will be protected; 25 that it permitted the
states to legislate the rights of creditors in bankruptcy; 26 that it made
27
that it rendered belatedly
secured credit costlier and harder to get;
perfected security interests forever voidable in the event of subsequent
bankruptcy; 28 that it was inequitable in that its result was unjust enrich29
and
ment to unsecured creditors at the expense of secured creditors;
that it distorted the policy of the Act in that it tipped "the balance between
the two conflicting policies of the Bankruptcy Act-to promote equality
of distribution among creditors and to preserve security interests fairly

20.
21.
22.

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

(4) When Constance cannot be distinguished on the fact (applicable state law)
and its application will invalidate a security interest otherwise valid in bankruptcy, the lower Federal courts have not hesitated to reject the rule, infra note 20.
Only in the Second Circuit has Constance been followed on a square holding, and
even there the case was severely criticized in the District Court before being followed.
In re Gondola Associates, 132 F.Supp. 205 (E.D.N.Y. 1955). The court stated that
"[tihe result here reached seems incongruous: a state statute enacted to protect
creditors who are such at a given date is held to operate in favor of a trustee in
bankruptcy who really stands in empty shoes, for he occupies a space which does
not exist, since there is no creditor who might enforce the right which he asserts.
I find it difficult to reconcile the present decision with the equitable purposes of the
Bankruptcy Act, but agree with the referee that the opinion of the Constance
case seems to compel such a result .. ." On appeal, the case was affirmed, Conti
v. Volper, 229 F.2d 317 (2d Cir. 1956), wherein the court recited the strong-arm
clause, cited Constance v. Harvey, and dismissed argument with the statement that
(5) Other
"it is difficult to see how such plain language could be disregarded."
provisions of the Bankruptcy Act may produce the same result as Constance; in
these situations, where the result would be the same if Constance were not applied,
the case itself cannot be said to have resulted in loss to the secured creditor.
E.g., in Miller v. Sulmeyer, 263 F.2d 513 (9th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S.
838, a purchase money mortgage not filed for seventy-nine days was held invalid in
bankruptcy. The court relied upon the fact that there was an actual interim
creditor who could have avoided the mortgage and therefore the trustee could avoid
the mortgage under section 70e(l) of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 110(e) (1),
and also relied upon the strong-arm clause giving the trustee the same rights as
hypothetical interim general creditor to produce the same result.
In re Billings, 170 F.Supp. 253 (W.D. Mo. 1959) ; In re Alikasovich, 275 F.2d 454
(6th Cir. 1960) ; Bissell v. Doty Discount Corp., 183 F.Supp. 783 (W.D. Mich. 1960).
Zamore v. Goldblatt, 194 F.2d 933 (2d Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 343 US. 979;
McKay v. Trusco Finance Co., 198 F.2d 431 (5th Cir. 1952) ; In re Krantz Candy Co.,
214 F.2d 588 (7th Cir. 1954).
Weintraub, Levin and Bedlock, The Strong-Arm Clause Strikes the Belated Chattel
Mortgage, 25 Ford. L. Rev. 261, 265, 273 (1956); MacLachlan, Two Wrongs Make
a Right, 37 Tex. L. Rev. 676, 678 (1959); Seligson, Bankruptcy, 30 N.Y.U. L. Rev.
558, 561 (1955); Comment, 30 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1113, 1114.
Collier, $ 70.51, p. 1432; Weintraub, Levin and Bedlock, op. cit. supra note 22, at
273-274; Comment, 30 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1113, 1115 (1955).
Collier,
70.51, p. 1432; Weintraub, Levin and Bedlock, op. cit. supra note 22,
at 273-274; Marsh, Constance v. Harvey-The "Strong-Arm Clause" Re-Evaluated,
43 Cal. L. Rev. 65, 73-74 (1955); Seligson Bankruptcy, 30 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 558, 561.
See Comment, 57 Mich. L. Rev. 1227 (1959).
MacLachlan, op. cit. supra note 22, at 680.
MacLachlan, op. cit. supra note 22, at 679.
Collier, 70.51, p. 1433; Marsh, op. cit. supra note 24, at 67-70; Seligson, Bankruptcy,
30 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 558, 561; Comment, 30 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1113, 1115.
Weintraub, Levin and Bedlock, op. cit. supra note 22, at 273; Marsh, op. cit. supra
note 24, at 71; Seligson, Creditors' Rights, 32 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 708, 723.
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acquired-too far in favor of the first." 30

These criticisms, except for the

first two, : remain unanswered. Unquestionably, Constance did go a long
way in vitiating the necessity and effectiveness of 70e (1) ;32 no doubt it likewise unnecessarily involved the Federal and State governments in each
other's alfairs."" The other criticisms, excepting those of construction and
interpretation, it is here submitted, are not so telling as they first appear.
Where the line should be drawn in balancing the conflicting interests of
secured and unsecured creditors is a matter of policy from which equities
or inequities do not flow. If, as Professor MacLachlan states, Constance
makes secured credit costlier and harder to get,3 4 it cannot follow that in
subsequent bankruptcy Constance produces an inequitable result to
secured creditors. The very fact that the cost of secured credit has risen
shows that the increased risk to the security has already been discounted.
Businessmen adjust their transactions to meet whatever known risks are
involved. Can it be said to be inequitable that the risk occasionally

3
matures? 5

Although judicial acceptance of Constance was not overwhelming, the
36
recent case of In re Alikasovich1
represents the first and only decision
by a Court of Appeals to reject Constance on a square holding. The case
went upon certio-aris 7 to the Supreme Court as Lewis v. Manufacturers
National Bank of Detroit,3a wherein the'Court affirmed unanimously the
Alikasovich decision. After tracing the history of the strong-arm clause,
the Court states it holding as follows:
We think that one consistent theory underlies the several
versions of Sec. 70, sub. c which we have set forth, viz., that the
rights of creditors-whether they are existing or hypothetical-to
which the trustee succeds are to be ascertained as of "the date of
.10.
31.
32.

33.

34.
35.

36.
37.
38

Marsh, op. cit. supra note 24, at 71.
These defenses are made in Note, 45 Va. L. Rev. 573 (1959).
Basically, section 70e (I) of the Bankruptcy Act, II U.S.C. § 110(e) (1), gives to
the trustee the rights of actual general creditors. Constance gives to-the trustee
the rights of any general creditor, whether or not such.creditor actually exists.
Since Constance gives the trustee these rights it is immaterial whether section 70e (1)
has application or not.
Since application of Constance depends upon state law, supra note 13 and text
relating thereto, the states can protect secured creditors by enacting laws that exclude
Constance from application in bankruptcy. Conversely, Constance may (state law
permitting) invalidate security interests in bankruptcy that are valid under state
law.
Supra note 27.
Examined more closely, it appears that Constance produces no inequitable results
to secured creditors generally; however, the rule may produce inequitable results for
some secured creditors. If no inequities result only when known risks are discounted, it follows that where the risk is not known at the time of the transaction,
inequities may result when the risk that later matures was not know in advance
and therefore not discounted. It may be said therefore that Constance is inequitable to secured creditors who were such before the Constance decision. There can
be no inequity to secured creditors who became such only after Constance since
it is presumed the added risk was here discounted. Possible windfalls to secured
creditors who became such after Constance as a result of the Constance decision are
disctssed infra note 47.
275 F.2d 545 (6th Cir. 1950). cert. granted, 363 U.S. 837. The case has been cited
both as In re Alikasovich and as Lewis v. Manufacturers National Bank of Detroit.
Certiorari was granted, 363 U.S. 837, 80 S.Ct. 1613, 4 L.Ed.2d 1723, because of the
clear conflict with Constance v. Harvey.
. . U.S .. . 81 S.Ct. 347, ... L.Ed.2d ... (1961).

NOTES
bankruptcy,'
not at an anterior point of time. That is to say,
the trustee acquires the status of a creditor as of the time when the

petition of bankruptcy is filed. We read the statutory words "the
or hypothetical] then holding
rights . . . of a creditor [existing
40
a lien" to refer to that date.
This construction seems to us to fit the scheme of the Act.4 '
The Court squarely rejects the Constance interpretation of the strong-arm
clause because -[t]hat construction [Constance v. Harvey]42 would enrich
unsecured creditors at the expense of secured creditors, creating a windfall
The Court then explains
merely by the happenstance of bankruptcy.""
why it feels Constance to be inequitable to secured creditors:
Congress in striking a balance between secured and unsecured creditors has provided for specific periods of repose
beyond which transactions of the bankrupt prior to bankruptcy
may no longer be upset-except and unless existing creditors can
set them aside. Yet if we construe Sec. 70, sub. c as petitioner
does, there would be no period of repose. Security tranactions
entered into in good-faith years before bankruptcy could be upset
if the trustee were ingenious enough to conjure up a hypothetical
situation in which a hypothetical creditor might have had such
a right. The rule pressed upon us would deprive a mortgagee of
his rights in states like Michigan, if the mortgage had been executed months or even years previously and there had been a delay
of a day or two in recording withou.t any creditor having been
44
injured during the period when the mortgage was unrecorded.
The Court will not, therefore, adopt the Constance construction because
"'t]hat is too great a wrench for us to give the bankruptcy system, absent
a plain indication from Congress which is lacking here." 45
The rule of the Lewis case is clear: the trustee obtains no rights
prior to the date of bankruptcy under the strong-arm clause. The Court
reasons that Congress meant to strike a balance between the interests of
secured and unsecured creditors by providing "for specific periods of
respose beyond which [secured] transactions of the bankrupt prior to
bankruptcy may no longer be upset," that Constance strikes a different
balance which produces inequitable results to secured creditors, and that
this inequitable construction will not be adopted "absent a plain indication from Congress which is lacking here."
CONCLUSION

The Lewis case will be universally acclaimed as the cure to all the
ills engendered by Constance v. Harvey. The decision is unquestionably
correct, for by it the Supreme Court restores once again the harmony
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Note 5 of Lewis opinion supra note 38, 81 S.Ct. at 349.
Note 6 of Lewis opinion supra note 38, 81 S.Ct. at 349.
Note 7 of Lewis opinion supra note 38, 81 S.Ct. at 350.
"The construction of § 70, sub. c which petitioner urges would give the trustee
power to set aside transactions which no creditor could vond and which injured
no creditor." Supra note 38 at 81 S.Ct. 350.
Supra note 38, 81 S.Ct. at 350.
Supra note 38, 81 S.St. at 350.
Supra note 38, 81 S.Ct. at 351.
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between the strong-arm clause and the other provisions of the Bankruptcy
Act, restores a proper balance betwccn the conflicting interests of secured
and unsecured creditors, and reduces the unwarranted interference by
the Federal and State governments in each other's affairs. Its main beneficial aspect, aside from policy considerations discussed by the Court, is
that it eliminates the worst of the bad effects the Bankruptcy Act could
4t
have upon increases in state homestead exemptions. 1 As previously
47
however, no great equitable benefits flow from the Lewis
suggested
decision, though certainly no great inequities are produced. Its practical
result will be to ease the strain on secured transactions and to create a
somewhat greater risk in unsccured transactions. Perhaps the most valid
criticism of Constance v. Harvey is that it injected unnecessary uncertainty
into the law. The great virtue of the Lewis case is that it removes this
Secured transactions can now be entered into without the
uncertainty.
former nagging concern over whether or not, at some undetermined time
in the future, the security will be disallowed in bankruptcy. All concerned can now breathe more easily.
CHARLES

PHILLIPS

STANDING TO OBJECT TO AN UNLAWFUL SEARCH
AND SEIZURE
A subject of constituional and criminal law which has received much
serious consideration during the past 50 years is unlawful search and seizure.
Since the advent of the automobile with the resultant transient society
which characterizes life in the United States today, search and seizure has
acquired a complexity not exceeded by any other aspect of criminal law.
The U.S. Constiution provides that "the right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
' The right to object to
searches and seizures, shall not be violated .
unreasonable search and seizure is considered a personal right and can only
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Supra note 15. Although the overruling of Constance removes the most lethal of
the trustee's weapons for invalidation of state exemptions in bankruptcy, it by no
means assures that all exemptions will now be honored therein. Where filing is
not completed, though required for perfection of the exemption, the trustee can
still invalidate the exemption in bankruptcy through his status as lien creditor tinder the strong-arm clause. Sampsell v. Straub, 194 F.2d 228 (9th Cir. 1951),
cert. denied, 340 U.S. 815. Further. where there are actual general creditors,
however small, prior to the exemption or to an increase therein, the trustee can
avoid in toto the exemption or increase under section 70e (1) and the doctrine of
Moore v. Bay, 284 U.S. 4. 52 S.Ct. 3, 76 L.Sd. 133, e.g., England v. Sanderson, 236
F.2d 641 (9th Cir. 1956) in view of the later case of Miller v. Sulmeyer, 263 F.2d
513 (9th Cir. 1959).
Supra note 35. As there suggested, Constance could produce inequitable results
with respect to security interests entered into before Constance. The same reasoning would lead to the conclusion that a windfall to secured creditors who became

such after Constance has resulted front the Lewis case, in that the Constance

produced risk was discounted in those transactions, a risk that no longer exists.
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U.S. Const., Amend. IV. Cf., identical langlage in Wyo. Const., Art. I, § 4. This
note is concerned with federal courts and those states whose rules of evidence
provide for a motion to suppress or return of evidence seized as the result of an
illegal search and seizure.

